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The hidden impact of corruption
Marco Pani
1. Introduction
While corruption has several implications, 
one aspect that seems to have received com-
paratively little attention are the effects of the 
possibility that it may occur, rather than of 
its actual occurrence. These effects arise be-
cause the threat of corruption reduces the set 
of feasible contracts in a principal-agent rela-
tion, making it more difficult to adopt schemes 
that prevent collusion; as a result, the threat of 
corruption reduces the expected utility of the 
parties involved even when corruption is suc-
cessfully prevented and not actually observed 
–  a situation that may be described as “hid-
den corruption”. This paper focuses on these 
aspects, and shows how the effects of hidden 
corruption are generally comparable, and 
sometimes equivalent, to the effects of corrup-
tion actually occurring.
Following Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Klit-
gaard (1988), we analyse corruption within 
the framework of a principal-agent-client re-
lation. In our model, corruption arises from 
the perturbation of a pre-existing principal-
agent relation, where the principal is obliged 
to pay an exogenous basic salary to the agent 
in all situations, and can only apply non-neg-
ative variations to this reward, like awarding 
efficiency-related bonuses. While this is by 
no means the only type of restrictions that 
could generate corruption (other restrictions 
may derive from laws, regulations and other 
sources, or may be inherent to the particular 
relation that exists between the parties), this 
type of constraints may be frequently found 
whenever a minimum-salary legislation, pro-
fessional rules, or collective bargaining agree-
ments, impose a lower bound on the reward 
that is paid to civil service employees or other 
types of agents. In the presence of such con-
straints, collusion between the client and the 
agent cannot generally be prevented without 
reducing the utility of the principal, and the 
adoption of a legal norm prohibiting this collu-
sion can be seen as a means used by the latter 
to reduce this loss in utility. In her 1978 book 
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on the subject, Rose-Ackerman described cor-
ruption as a particular agency relation where 
“some third person, who can benefit from the 
agent’s action, seeks to influence the agent’s 
decision by offering him a monetary pay-
ment which is not passed to the principal” 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 6).1 While basically 
accepting this definition, we agree with the 
prevalent opinion in considering corruption 
as essentially illegal, and we therefore impose 
the additional requirement that the payment 
offered by the third party to the agent should 
contravene an existing norm.2 Specifically, we 
characterise corruption as a particular type of 
1 Along the same line, Barthan (1997) wrote that 
“in a majority of cases [...] corruption ordinarily 
refers to the use of public office for private gains, 
where the official (the agent) entrusted with carry-
ing out a task by the public (the principal) engages 
in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment 
which is difficult to monitor by the principal” (p. 
1321). Similar definitions were provided by Fried-
rich (1989) and by Lowenstein (1989). Friedrich 
identified “a corruption pattern [...] whenever [...] 
a responsible functionary or office holder, is by 
monetary or other rewards... induced to take ac-
tions which favour whoever provides the reward 
and thereby damage the group or organisation 
to which the functionary belongs, more specifi-
cally the Government” (Friedrich, 1989, p. 15); for 
Lowenstein, corruption implies the involvement of 
a “public official”, a “corrupt intent” by the parties 
involved, the transfer to the official of something of 
value, and the existence of a relationship between 
this thing of value and an official act; moreover, 
this relationship must include an intent to influ-
ence the act (Lowenstein, 1989, pp. 30-31).
2  Andvig and Moene (1990) claim that “[a] mem-
ber of a public organisation acts in a corrupt way if 
he [...] deals with a non-member and uses the or-
ganisation’s resources [...]to acquire payment that 
is against the rules of the organisation or against 
the law” (Andvig and Moene, 1990, p.65). In our 
opinion, however, corruption derives not so much 
from the improper use of some organisation’s re-
sources, as from the improper use of discretionary 
power; moreover, corruption is not confined to 
public organisations, and can be found also in the 
private sector (on this point see Rose-Ackerman, 
1989).
principal-agent-client relation with the fol-
lowing characteristics: the principal delegates 
some discretionary power to the agent, requir-
ing him to perform a particular task; the agent 
makes a contract with the client, whereby he 
agrees to deviate from the instructions of the 
principal to the benefit of the client, in ex-
change for some reward; but this contract is 
illegal, in the sense that it violates an existing 
norm. This norm may derive from a variety 
of sources, but is economically relevant inso-
far as its violation involves a positive risk of 
punishment for the parties who commit it; 
following Becker (1968), we assume that this 
punishment can be quantified in terms of an 
equivalent monetary fine.
Four economic relations thus characterise 
corruption and distinguish it from other types 
of action: (i) an agency relation between the 
principal and the agent; (ii) a contractual rela-
tion between the agent and the client; (iii) an 
obligation (resulting from some norm) on the 
part of the agent, of the client, or both, not to 
undertake such a contract; and (iv) a conflict 
of interests between the client and the princi-
pal. A direct contractual relation between the 
principal and the client is not an essential ele-
ment of corruption and for this reason it will 
not be considered here, although this relation 
can be found in a variety of particular cases, 
like, for instance, when corruption is related to 
tax evasion or the control of crime.3
In comparisons with other types of action, 
the first of the above relations is absent when 
two partners collude to commit a theft, the 
second relation is absent in the case of mere 
abuse of power or nepotism, the third in the 
case of legal collusion (of the type discussed, 
for instance, by Kofman and Lawarree, 1996); 
the fourth relation finally, draws the dis-
tinction between corruption and extortion; 
3  This relation has in fact been frequently for-
malised in works which analysed corruption in re-
lation to tax evasion and crime control: see for in-
stance Virmani (1983); Chander and Wilde (1992); 
Besley and McLaren (1993); Mookherjee and Png 
(1995).
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remarkably, this distinction has not always 
been acknowledged by authors who analysed 
these topics, who often used a different ter-
minology and adopted a different perspective 
(for instance, Beenstock, 1979; Cadet, 1987).4 
The concept of corruption is however differ-
ent from the concept of extortion; corruption 
stems from a bilateral agreement between the 
agent and the client, who illegally collude to 
obtain a benefit at the expense of the princi-
pal, while extortion derives from a unilateral 
abuse of discretion on the part of the agent, 
who threatens to deviate from the principal’s 
instruction in order to obtain an undue ben-
efit at the expense of the client. Even when it is 
the client who makes an offer to the agent, the 
situation is one of extortion whenever the of-
fer is made in response to an implicit, but evi-
dent, threat. In a wider sense, the word “cor-
ruption” has been more or less explicitly used 
by some authors to include extortion as a par-
ticular case (Klitgaard, 1988; Hindricks et al., 
1996; Bliss and Di Tella, 1997); in this paper, 
4 A clear illustration of the distinction between 
corruption and extortion can be found in Bardhan 
(1997): “I am told that in Russia there is a clear ter-
minological distinction between mzdoimstvo, tak-
ing a remu neration to do what you are supposed 
to do, and likhoimstvo, taking a remuneration for 
what you are not supposed to do” (p.1323). Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) distinguished between corrup-
tion “with theft”, where an official who sells a good 
provided by the Government hides the sale and 
keeps the whole price of the good, and corruption 
“without theft”, where the official illegally increas-
es the price of the goods and keeps for himself the 
difference between the actual and the official price. 
Corruption with theft is similar to our narrower 
definition of corruption, since the official illegally 
provides the good to somebody who is not enti tled 
to it, in exchange for an undue reward which he 
does not transfer to the principal; corruption with-
out theft, instead, is similar to extortion, since the 
official provides the good to someone who is en-
titled to have it, and illegally demands a bribe on 
top of the price decided by the principal.
however, we use it in a stricter sense and we 
limit our attention to our narrower definition 
of corruption.
We thus develop a model where all the 
above relations are present; we start with a ba-
sic principal-agent relation, and analyse how 
it is perturbed by the intervention of a client 
who offers a bribe to the agent; we analyse the 
utility implications of the new equilibria, and 
we examine how they are altered by the im-
position of a norm banning corruption, sup-
ported by a non-negative probability of pun-
ishment in case of violation. We characterise 
the equilibria that arise in two different cas-
es, when the implementation of the norm is 
monitored without costs at an exogenous rate, 
and when monitoring is costly to the princi-
pal who decides, in return, the probability of 
detection. This framework will also be used to 
analyse other features of corruption, like the 
attitudes of the parties towards the introduc-
tion of the above norm, and the implications 
of corruption in terms of efficiency and distri-
bution. Moreover, we use this model to show 
that multiple equilibria are possible even in 
a static context (their existence in a dynamic 
context was proved by Lui, 1986, Cadot, 1987, 
and Andvig and Moene, 1990); finally, we dis-
cuss some empirical and normative implica-
tions of our results.
The results that we obtain confirm the ba-
sic idea that most effects of corruption arise 
from its threat rather than from its actual oc-
currence. While corruption reduces aggregate 
utility and the expected utility of the principal, 
these effects generally persist – although re-
duced in magnitude – when corruption is pre-
vented, but remains a real possibility. Indeed, 
while corruption actually takes place only in 
one type of equilibria, the expected utility of 
the parties in the other types of equilibria may 
not be too different, and, in particular circum-
stances, may even be the same. Relevant dif-
ferences in utility appear instead between the 
equilibria that arise when corruption is pos-
sible and those that exist when corruption is 
not a feasible option (for instance, because the 
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client does not exist at all).5
The introduction of a legal norm banning 
corruption allows in some cases to reduce the 
magnitude of these effects and leads in other 
cases to a different type of equilibrium; in gen-
eral, however, it fails to restore the initial utility 
distribution. The adoption of this norm, more-
over, is met with different attitudes in different 
circumstances; sometimes, it is unanimously 
supported, other times it is rejected without 
objections, while in other cases it becomes an 
item of conflict over the distribution of rent. 
The fact that certain types of behaviour (like 
Parliamentary lobbying) are legally allowed 
in some countries and constitute an offence of 
corruption in others may thus be interpreted 
as the result of a perfectly rational choice.
An a priori evaluation of the social effects of 
hidden corruption is also rather problematic; 
in some cases, the threat of corruption leads to 
a Pareto-inferior outcome and is thus a source 
of inefficiency, but in other cases it generates 
a redistribution of rent which benefits some 
parties at the expense of others, leading to 
a new equilibrium along the Pareto-efficient 
frontier.
On the empirical side, our results imply that 
a proper evaluation of the impact of corruption 
cannot merely rely on statistics of its observed 
occurrence; further information is required, in 
order to obtain a proper evaluation of the im-
pact of the unobservable threat of corruption. 
Useful indicators in this sense might be pro-
vided by data concerning the reward structure 
of the agents, the probability of detection and 
the costs of monitoring, and some estimates 
of the amount that might be paid on bribes if 
corruption actually occurs. On the normative 
side, the design of effective anti-corruption 
strategies should extend beyond the adoption 
5 Throughout the paper, we shall ignore the ex-
pected utility of the client (a discussion of the rea-
sons is provided in Section 3). Our results only 
apply to the effects of actual or hidden corruption 
on the particular subset of parties which does not 
include the client – namely, the principal and the 
agent.
of merely repressive measures (like inten-
sive monitoring and severe punishment), to 
include other types of intervention aimed at 
reducing the opportunities for corruption, in-
cluding educational campaigns to increase the 
degree of honesty.
Our work builds on previous studies on cor-
ruption, particularly on the literature which 
analysed corruption in the framework of the 
theory of agency (Virmani, 1983; Chander 
and Wilde, 1992; Besley and McLaren, 1993; 
Mookherjee and Png, 1995; Hindricks et al., 
1996).  Our model also bears some similarities 
with the work of Spiller (1990), who analysed 
a trilateral agency relation very similar to the 
principal-agent-client relation discussed here.
The effects of the threat of corruption, how-
ever, do not appear to have received much at-
tention in this literature, and the role played 
by restrictions on the set of feasible contracts 
has also been ignored. Our approach is some-
how more general because we consider cor-
ruption in its essential structure rather than 
in relation with tax evasion or other specific 
situations; for this reason, we do not apply the 
principal-supervisor-agent model, that is gen-
erally used, preferring the more encompassing 
principal-agent-client formalisation, which 
does not require a direct contractual relation 
between the principal and the client.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 
2 presents an outline of the model, where cor-
ruption is not legally prohibited; Section 3 
analyses the causes and effects of the intro-
duction of a legal prohibition, in the case when 
the probability of detecting its violations is ex-
ogenous (Subsection 3.1) and when it is endog-
enous and costly for the principal (Sub section 
3.2). Section 4 draws some final remarks and 
conclusions.
2 The model
A principal hires an agent to perform some 
task e, which can be carried out in two ways, 
e and e; e requires hard work and a high ef-
fort on the part of the agent, while e requires 
a lower effort and can be carried out working 
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“lazily”. Obviously, the agent prefers e, while 
the principal prefers e, because it implies, for 
instance, a more efficient organisation of some 
productive activity, bearing higher output at 
lower costs.6 The principal cannot perfectly 
observe how the agent works, thus he cannot 
condition payment on the actual performance 
of the high effort. The principal only receives 
a random message m, whose probability dis-
tribution is correlated with the agent’s work 
performance; when the agent works hard, the 
message is equal to 1 with probability p > 1/2 
and to 0 otherwise; when the agent works la-
zily, the message is equal to 1 with probabil-
ity (1 — p), otherwise it is equal to 0; in other 
words, the message is ‘true’ with probability p 
and ‘false’ with probability (1 — p). The princi-
pal thus conditions the amount of the payment 
on the realisation of this random binary mes-
sage. If the message is. 0, the principal pays 
the agent a minimum amount, which we as-
sume to be exogenously given and normalised 
to 0; this amount may derive, for instance, 
from a legal provision binding all employers 
to pay in all situations a minimum basic salary 
to their employees, irrespective of their actual 
work performance. If the message is. 1, the 
principal pays, in addition to the minimum 
salary, a performance-related bonus, which 
we shall simply call “the bonus” (or sometimes 
the “incentives”), whose amount t he declares 
in advance. A contract of this type is generally 
known as an incentive scheme, and under gen-
eral conditions can induce the agent to work 
hard even if the principal cannot perfectly ob-
6 This conflict of interest between the principal 
and the agent is not essential. Corruption may take 
place even when the agent is indifferent between 
alternative ways of performing this task, or when 
he strictly prefers to follow the instructions unless 
he receives an adequate payment in order to de-
viate. The case of a conflict of interest is however 
more interesting because it involves the strongest 
incentive to deviate and accept the bribe, and thus 
the highest opportunities for corruption. Our re-
sults extend however, with minor variations, to the 
other cases.
serve him.7 Both principal and agent have qua-
si-linear utility functions, that depend on the 
work effort of the agent, e, and on the amount 
that is paid to him at the end. The utility of 
the principal is equal to W(e, x) ≡ w(e) — x, 
where x is the amount of the payment (equal 
to t when the bonus is paid and to 0 other-
wise), while the utility of the agent is U(e,x) ≡ 
u(e) + x. The principal’s preference for a high 
work effort is equal to ∆w ≡ w(e) — w(e) while 
the agent’s preference for a low work effort is 
equal to ∆u ≡ u(e) — u(e).
Both parties are risk-neutral and take their 
decisions in order to maximise their expect-
ed utility.8 The principal offers an incentive 
scheme that specifies the amount t of the bo-
nus; the agent accepts the scheme and decides 
how to work. Once the work is done, a reali-
sation of the random message m reaches the 
principal and is also observed by the agent; the 
bonus t is then paid, conditional on m being 
equal to 1.
The optimal choice for each party in equi-
librium can be derived by backward induction. 
The agent responds to the offer of the princi-
pal, working hard if and only if the incentive 
scheme meets the incentive compatibility con-
straint (ICC):
 2 1 a
ut t
p
∆
≥ ≡
−  (1)
and working lazily otherwise.9 The princi-
7 The conditions required for an incentive scheme 
to be effective are the “participation constraint” 
and the “incentive compatibility” (or “individual 
rationality”) constraint. The participation con-
straint ensures that the agent accepts to work for 
the principal at the agreed conditions and does 
not seek employment elsewhere; in this paper, 
we assume that the participation constraint is al-
ways satisfied, as a result of the legal requirement 
of a minimum salary. The incentive compatibility 
constraint is discussed in the text.
8 Since the only random variable in the utility 
function is t, and since the utility function is linear 
in t, risk neutrality is here equivalent to a von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern utility maximising behaviour.
9 When the agent works hard, his expected util-
ity is U(H) ≡ (e)+pt, since he receives the bonus t 
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pal knows this constraint and the agent’s re-
sponse, and offers a bonus equal to t if and 
only if 
 Δw ≥ pt (2)
otherwise, he offers no bonus at all, and the 
agent only receives his basic salary, deciding, 
in turn, to work lazily.10 Substituting (1) into 
(2) yields
 2 1
pw u
p
∆ ≥ ∆
−  (3)
which is the condition under which the 
agent works hard in equilibrium. We assume 
here after that this condition is always satis-
fied.
At this point a third party intervenes, whom, 
in Klitgaard’s terminology, we shall ini tially 
call “the client”, and whom we shall later call 
“the corruptor” (the word “corruptor” is not 
appropriate at this stage, because no norm ex-
ists which forbids the client’s interven tion). 
Like the principal, the client is affected by the 
work effort of the agent, but, unlike him, he 
strictly prefers the low effort. Moreover, the 
client has perfect information about the way 
whenever the message is ‘true’, which occurs with 
probability p (otherwise, he just receives his basic 
salary, equal to 0); when he works lazily, his ex-
pected utility is U(L) ≡ u(e) + (1 — p)t, since this 
time he obtains the bonus only when the message 
is ‘false’, which occurs with probability (1 — p). The 
agent thus decides to work hard if and only if U(H) 
> U(L), which implies (1).
10 The principal never sets t> to since he can obtain 
the same behaviour from the agent at a lower cost 
– by setting t = t; similarly, he never sets t > t > 0 
since this would induce the agent to work lazily, in 
which case it would be more convenient to set t = 
0. When the principal offers t = t, the agent works 
hard by (1) and the principal’s expected utility is 
equal to W(H) ≡ w(e) — pt, since with probability p 
the message will be equal to 1 and the principal will 
have to pay the bonus t. When the principal sets t 
= 0, the agent works lazily and the principal only 
pays the basic salary irrespective of the realisation 
of the message, obtaining an expected utility equal 
to W (L) ≡ w(e). The principal thus offers t = t if 
and only if W(H) > W(L), whence (2).
the agent works (unlike the principal),11 and 
offers a payment to the agent condi tional on 
his performance of the low effort. We shall re-
fer to this payment as “the gift”, and, at a later 
stage, as “the bribe”.12
For instance, consider the case of an in-
dustry that wants to dispose illegally of its 
pol luting waste. The industry is subject to 
controls by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and these controls are carried out by 
inspectors whose actual effort the Agency can-
not perfectly observe.13 If the inspectors work 
hard, they pay frequent and accurate visits 
to the plants to check how the waste is being 
treated; if they work lazily, their visits are rare 
and inaccurate. The firm obviously prefers 
the inspectors to work lazily, and offers them 
a payment conditional on their visits being 
rare and superficia1.14 Alternatively, consider 
a taxpayer submitting false reports to the Tax 
11 The assumption that the client can perfectly ob-
serve the work effort of the agent is not essential; 
the client may for instance receive a second ran-
dom message, S, correlated with the work effort 
of the agent, and may condition the payment of 
the gift on a particular realisation of this random 
message. In our model, however, this assumption 
allows to simplify the analysis, without loss of gen-
erality.
12 Like the word “corruptor”, also the word “bribe” 
is not yet appropriate, since no norm exists forbid 
di the gift.
13 A similar case is described in Mookherjee and 
Png (1995).
14 This payment needs not necessarily consist of 
a sum of money in a sealed envelope. The industry, 
for instance, may promise the inspectors well re-
warded jobs once they leave the Agency. Moreover, 
we abstract from the fact that the firm could bribe 
the inspectors after their visit in order to obtain 
false and favourable reports; this possibility may 
in some cases be easily prevented, for instance, 
by including newly appointed junior members in 
the inspecting teams; while these members may 
be unable to decide the timing and number of the 
inspections, they may be able to inform higher au-
thorities about the alteration of the reports, ren-
dering ex-post corruption prohibitively risky.
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Collecting Agency of the Exchequer.15 The re-
ports are examined by auditors on behalf of 
the Agency but the Agency cannot control how 
the auditors carry out their work. The audi-
tors may examine the reports carefully, cross-- 
checking all declarations and matching them 
with additional information at their disposal, 
or they may merely perform a formal, quick 
check of the consistency of the declarations. 
The Agency obviously prefers the first option, 
but the taxpayer strongly prefers the second, 
and offers a payment to the auditors to con-
vince them to adopt it.
The gift enters the agent’s utility function 
in the same way as the payment given by the 
principal; the utility of the principal, on the 
contrary, is not directly affected by the gift. We 
assume that the value of the gift is decided by 
the client and is known by all parties; the client 
ignores how the agent is going to act if he does 
not offer the gift, and ignores both the agent’s 
utility function and the incentives offered by 
the principal. As a result, the client offers a gift 
of fixed amount b, equal to his willingness to 
pay to have the agent work lazily rather than 
hard.16 These assumptions greatly simplify the 
analysis, allowing to abstract from the client’s 
maximisation problem and from a discussion 
of the bargaining process between the agent 
and the client, in order to focus on the effects 
of the client’s intervention on the relation be-
tween the principal and the agent. While the 
preferences of the client may play a major role 
with respect to a number of aspects related to 
corruption,
they are not essential to the purposes of this 
paper.17 One implication of these assumptions 
15 For a similar case see Chander and Wilde (1992).
16 In other words, when the agent accepts the gift, 
he extracts all the client’s rent from e.
17 An exogenous value of the gift is also assumed 
by Bac (1996); Chander and Wilde (1992) assume 
instead that the gift is equal to a fixed, exogenous 
share of the client’s rent, equal to a fraction γ of 
the tax evaded by the client. Other authors (for 
instance, Viiniani, 1983; Basu et al., 1992; Besley 
and McLaren, 1993; Mookherjee and Png, 1995) 
assume that the rent is divided according to a Nash 
is that the utility of the client is the same when 
the agent accepts the gift and works lazily
as when he rejects it and works hard. A fur-
ther assumption that we make is that the client 
has an established reputation for honouring 
his promises, which allows to abstract from 
any problems of enforcement that normally 
arise with illegal contracts.18
The offer of the gift increases the agent’s 
preference for working lazily; this in turn al-
ters the incentives compatibility constraint, 
which becomes:19
 2 1b a
u bt t
p
∆ +
≡ >
−
 (4)
The principal must now decide whether or 
not he should increase the bonus to meet the 
new constraint: if he does not, the agent will 
be lazy and the best choice will be to pay no 
bonus at all, irrespective of the message. In 
absence of restrictions on the set of contracts, 
the principal could offer an incentive scheme 
that satisfies the new incentive compatibility 
constraint yielding the same expected utility 
to the principal as he had before; for instance, 
he may raise the bonus to t and reduce the sal-
ary to -p(t — t); in alternative, he could con-
tinue to over the same salary as before, pay 
a bonus still equal to t when the message is. 1, 
and convince the agent to work hard by paying 
a negative bonus equal to -p(t — t) whenever 
the message is. 0; or, finally, he could resort 
bargaining solution.
18 For a discussion see Paul and Wilhite (1994), 
and Kofman and Lawarree’s remarks about self-
enforcing collusion agreements (Kofman and 
Lawarree, 1996, p. 390). Bardhan (1997), in his 
survey of economic studies on corruption and de-
velopment, writes that this problem has also been 
discussed in: Boycko, M.; Shleifer, A.; and Vishny, 
R.W. (1995), Privatizing Russia, Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press.
19 The expected utility of the agent if he works hard 
is unaffected by the gift, which is not paid in this 
case; his expected utility if he works lazily accepting 
the gift becomes U(Lb) ≡ u(e) + pt + b; the agent 
thus works hard if and only if U(H) ≥ U(Lb), which 
implies t ≥ t.
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to an appropriate mix of salary reductions and 
negative bonuses. All these arrangements are 
however prevented by the legal requirement 
of a minimum salary, which forbids both sal-
ary reductions and the imposition of a nega-
tive bonus; as a result, the principal can only 
choose between raising the bonus to t and pay-
ing no bonus at all, knowing that in this case 
the agent would work lazily. He chooses the 
first option if and only if20
 Δw ≥ pt > pt  (5)
Since (5) is more restrictive than (3), the 
intervention of the client may induce the prin-
cipal to withdraw the bonus rather than in-
crease it, leading from an equilibrium where 
the agent works hard to one where the agent 
works lazily. By (3), (4) and (5), this occurs 
whenever
 ( ) ( )2 1 2 1
p pu b u u
p p
∆ + > ∆ ≥ ∆
− −  (6)
When (6) holds instead, the expected utility 
of the principal is lower in the new equilibri-
um. In the following sections of this paper we 
shall assume that (6) always holds.
When (5) holds, the principal raises the 
bonus to t, and the agent rejects the gift and 
continues to work hard. The intervention of 
the client does not affect the observable work 
performance of the agent, but it induces a re-
duction in the expected utility of the ‘principal 
(who has to pay a higher bonus if the message 
is. 1) which is exactly matched by an increase 
in the expected utility of the agent (who re-
ceives that bonus). Although no payment takes 
place between the client and the agent, the 
mere threat of it enables the agent to extract 
rent from the principal, inducing a redistribu-
tion in expected utility between those parties – 
a situation which we describe as “hidden cor-
20 If the principal offers a bonus equal to t, the 
agent works hard and the principal’s expected util-
ity is equal to W(H) ≡ w(e) — pt; if the principal of-
fers no bonus at all, the agent works lazily and the 
expected utility of the principal is equal to W(L) 
≡ w(e). The principal thus sets t = t if and only if 
W(e) — ptb ≥ w(e), whence (5).
ruption”:
Proposition 1 (Hidden corruption) When 
(5) holds, the agent rejects the client’s off er 
but the mere possibility of accepting it enables 
him to extract rent from the principal. The in-
tervention of the client thus induces a redistri-
bution of expected utility between the princi-
pal and the agent, without affecting the work 
performance of the latter.
When (5) fails, the principal offers no bo-
nus, the agent works lazily and the gift is actu-
ally paid. The effects of the intervention of the 
client are observable and evident. Since w(eL) 
< w(e) — pt, the expected utility of the princi-
pal is lower in the new equilibrium. Remark-
ably, the expected utility of the agent may also 
be lower; this occurs under the following con-
dition.
Condition 1 Inequality (6) holds; moreover,
 ( )
1
2 1
pb u
p
−
< ∆
−  (7)
In this case, the benefit that the agent de-
rives from working lazily accepting the gift 
does not offset the loss of the possibility of ob-
taining the bonus ta. This leads to the follow-
ing Proposition:
Proposition 2 When Condition 1 holds, the 
intervention of the client reduces the expect-
ed utility of both principal and agent, leading 
to an equilibrium which is Pareto-inefficient 
from the point of view of those parties.
The initial, Pareto-efficient equilibrium re-
mains a feasible outcome, but it is no longer 
an equilibrium because it is not subgame-per-
fect: should the principal agree to offers the 
original bonus t in order to maintain the previ-
ous outcome, the agent would strictly prefer to 
work lazily and accept the gift, and the initial 
outcome would not be reached all the same. 
Any promise on the part of the agent to act 
otherwise, working hard and rejecting the gift, 
would not be credible unless it were supported 
by some reliable means of enforcement (which 
might include moral concerns or a renown 
reputation for honesty). A legal norm obliging 
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the agent to reject the gift, involving some sort 
of punishment whenever he is caught accept-
ing it, may thus be seen as a means to increase 
the credibility of this promise. Once this norm 
is introduced, accepting the gift constitutes 
a proper act of corruption, in line with the def-
inition discussed in the previous section, and 
the gift itself can properly be called “a bribe”.
As we shall see in the following section, the 
attitudes of the two parties towards the intro-
duction of this norm vary under different cir-
cumstances. In general, we should expect the 
principal to support its introduction (since the 
intervention of the client always reduces his 
expected utility) while the agent would tend 
to support the introduction of the norm when 
Condition 1 holds, and to resist it in all other 
cases. In fact, the attitudes of both parties de-
pend on how effective the norm would be to 
prevent corruption, and on the costs that are 
incurred to implement the norm and to detect 
its violations. What is remarkable is that even 
the introduction of this norm would general-
ly fail to restore the initial equilibrium. More 
specifically, the introduction of the norm may 
successfully prevent the actual payment of the 
gift and may induce the agent to work hard, 
but the effects of hidden corruption on the ex-
pected utility of the parties would not general-
ly be removed (although they may be reduced 
in magnitude).
3 Equilibria with corruption
In the previous section, the use of the words 
“corruptor” and “bribe” was not appropriate, 
because no legal norm existed forbidding the 
client to offer the gift or prohibiting the agent 
to accept it; the contract between these parties 
thus failed the essential requirement of illegal-
ity, -that. would qualify it as corruption.
In this section, we assume that this contract 
is forbidden, and we therefore use the words 
“corruptor” and “bribe” We discuss the rea-
sons that justify the introduction of this pro-
vision, and we analyse the equilibria that are 
induced by its introduction and compare them 
with those that preceded both the interven-
tion of the client and its prohibition. A situa-
tion where the client does not intervene will 
hereafter be described as “a world without 
corruption”, while any situation where the cli-
ent is present and active will be described as 
“a world with corruption”, even when corrup-
tion remains hidden and does not actually oc-
cur. As is shown below, most effects on expect-
ed utility depend on whether or not we live in 
a world with corruption.
This section is divided in two subsections, 
that consider two different cases. First, we as-
sume that the implementation of the norm is 
randomly checked at zero costs, with an ex-
ogenous probability of detecting a violation 
when it occurs; in the second part, we assume 
that the costs of monitoring are positive and 
increase with the probability of detection.
When the agent is caught accepting a bribe, 
he has to pay a fine of exogenous amount F.21 
The fine enters the agent’s utility function in 
the same way as all other payments, but with 
a negative sign. The fine, however, is not paid 
to the principal and does not figure as an ar-
gument of his utility function.22 Assume, fol-
lowing Becker (1968), that the agent’s decision 
on whether or not to violate the norm depends 
only on which alternative maximises his ex-
pected utility; in other words, the agent is not 
bound by moral or other non-utilitarian con-
cerns.23 Violations, however, are not detected 
21 If no fine is imposed, the norm has no economic 
significance and corruption is not distinguishable 
from legal collusion. A similar case is analysed in 
Marjit’s model on corruptible hierarchies (Marjit, 
1996), where no penalties are imposed on either of 
the parties involved in corruption.
22 For instance, the fine may be paid to some inde-
pendent enforcement authority like the judiciary; 
in alternative, the fine may actually be paid to the 
principal but it could be entirely spent to cover the 
fixed costs of prosecution.
23 Some authors (for instance, Tirole, 1986) de-
scribe this type of behaviour as “opportunistic”, as 
opposed to “honest” (when the agent always de-
cides to abide by the norm) and “dishonest” (when 
he always violates it). In this paper, the agent is 
always opportunistic, and is said to be “honest” 
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with certainty; when they occur, they are de-
tected with probability π < 1, while when they 
do not occur they are never detected (inno-
cents are never found guilty). No fine is ever 
imposed on the corruptor.
Prosecution and punishment are public 
events, so the principal is perfectly informed 
about their occurrence; since the agent is never 
punished when innocent, and since the bribe 
is never paid when the agent works hard, the 
principal knows that, when the agent is fined, 
he must have been both guilty and lazy; as a re-
sult, the principal can improve the incentive 
scheme in the following way: if the agent is not 
fined, the principal proceeds as usual, paying 
the bonus if and only if the message is equal 
to 1; if the agent is fined, instead, the principal 
presumes that the agent has worked lazily and 
pays no bonus, irrespective of the message; by 
legal requirement, however, he always has to 
pay the minimum salary.24
The agent now can choose between three 
actions: reject the bribe and work hard (H); 
reject the bribe and work lazily (L); or accept 
the bribe and work lazily (C). He cannot accept 
the bribe and work hard, because in this case 
the corruptor would not pay the bribe. When 
the agent rejects the bribe, we shall say that he 
is “honest”, while when he accept it we shall 
say that he is “corrupt”.
The probability of the agent obtaining the 
bonus depends on which of these alternatives 
he chooses; when he is honest, the probability 
is equal to p if he works hard and to 1 – p if 
he works lazily, but when the agent is corrupt 
the probability of obtaining the bonus is equal 
to (1 — p)(1 — π), which is the joint probabil-
ity of escaping detection and obtaining a false 
favourable message (two events that are as-
when he maximises his expected utility by turning 
down the offer of the bribe.
24 Improvement in the quality of information oc-
curs even when the agent could be found guilty 
when he is innocent, provided this occurs with 
lower probability than when he is indeed guilty. 
Without loss of generality, we rule out this possi-
bility.
sumed to be independent). When the agent 
is corrupt, he obtains the bribe with certainty 
and he incurs the fine with probability π. The 
expected utility that he gains with each of these 
actions is thus equal to:
 ▪ U(H) u(e) + pt when he is honest and works 
hard,
 ▪ U(L) u(e) + (1 — p)t when he is honest and 
lazy, and
 ▪ U(C) u(e) + (1 — p)(1 — π)t + b — πF when 
he is corrupt.
The agent chooses the action which maxi-
mises his expected utility conditional on the 
values of it and t; therefore, he works hard if 
and only if t satisfies the new incentive com-
patibility constraint:
 t > t*(π) ≡ max(t, t(π)), (8)
where25
 ( ) ( )2 1 1c
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Since the agent rejects the bribe when he 
works hard, t*(π) is a corruption-proof in-
centive scheme.26 It can be shown that t(π) is 
a continuous, twice differentiable. strictly de-
creasing and convex function of π, and that 
t*(π) = t(π) if and only if it is not larger than 
some positive value π*, which we assume to be 
lower than unity. Moreover, t*(π) is continu-
ous, non-increasing and convex, and t(0) is 
equal to t.
25 The agent prefers (H) to (L) whenever U(H) 
> U(L), which occurs if and only if t > t (see the 
previous section); he prefers (H) to (C) whenever 
U(H) > U(C), which yields:
 u(e) + pt ≥ u(e) + (1 — p)(1 — π)t + b — πF,
 whence:
 [p — (1 — p)(1 — π)]t ≥ u(e) — u(e)+b — πF,
 which is equivalent to:
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 As a result, the agent prefers (H) to any other al-
ternative if and only if t > max (t , t(π)). Q.E.D.
26 Corruption-proof incentive schemes where the 
agent works lazily can be designed when it > 7T* 
, but the principal has no reason to adopt them, 
since he is only concerned with the work effort of 
the agent, and not directly affected by the bribe.
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Given the probability of detection, the agent 
works lazily whenever t < t*(π), and accepts 
the bribe only if t < (b — πF)/ [π(1 — p)].27 If 
t > t*(π), the agent works hard and rejects the 
bribe. Since t*(π) is decreasing when π < π* and 
constant thereafter, the incentives required to 
induce the agent to work hard diminish down 
to a minimum as the probability of detection 
increases; intuitively, the more likely the agent 
is to be caught when he accepts the bribe, the 
more inclined he will be to be honest and work 
hard. The minimum incentive-compatible bo-
nus is reached when π ≥ π* and is equal to t, 
which is the same bonus that is required to in-
duce the agent to work hard in a world without 
corruption.
The optimal choice for the agent is illustrat-
ed in Figure 1. In Zone A, both π and t are too 
low, and the agent works lazily and takes the 
bribe (C); in Zone B, π is high enough to induce 
honesty but t is too low to induce hard work, 
and the agent chooses (L); in Zone C, finally, 
both π and t are sufficiently high to induce the 
agent to work hard and be honest (H).
3.1 Equilibria without monitoring costs
The optimal choice for the principal de-
pends on which variables he controls and on 
which costs he has to pay. In this subsection, 
we assume that the principal can only decide 
the amount of the bonus, and has no control 
over monitoring. Monitoring is delegated to 
an independent authority like the judiciary, 
paid by the Government out of ordinary taxes. 
In the next subsection, we shall assume that 
the intensity of monitoring, and thus the prob-
ability of detection, are decided by the princi-
pal, who has to pay for their costs.
Since the utility of the principal does not 
directly depend on the bribe, the principal is 
only concerned with the quality of the agent’s 
27 The agent prefers (C) to (L) if and only if U(C) < 
U(L), which yields:
 u(e) + (1 — p)t < u(e) + (1 — p)(1 — π)t + b — πF 
(10)
 whence: π(1 — p)t < b — πF, which yields: t < (b 
— πF) / [π (1 — p)]. Q.E.D.
work, and with the amount of money- he has 
to pay to achieve it; the principal offer the in-
centive-compatible bonus if and only if pt*(π) 
< ∆w, otherwise he offers no bonus and lets 
the agent work lazily and accept the bribe.28
When π ≥ π*, the incentive-compatible bo-
nus t*(π) is equal to t, which is by assump-
tion lower than ∆w/p; therefore, the principal 
offers it; when π = 0, then t*(π) = t, which is 
higher than ∆w by assumption (6); therefore, 
the principal offers no bonus. Continuity and 
monotonicity of t*(π) in the interval [0,π*] 
thus ensure that there is a unique value π’ ≡ 
(0, π*) such that pt*(π’) = ∆w; the principal 
offers a positive bonus t = t*(π) if and only if π 
> π’ and no bonus otherwise.
The interval [0,1] of feasible values of the 
probability of detection can thus be divided 
into three areas, corresponding to three differ-
ent strategies and equilibria (see Figure When 
the probability of detection is lower than π’ 
(Area 1), the cost of inducing the agent to work 
hard is too high, and the principal prefers to 
offer no bonus and let him work lazily; fol-
lowing the suggestion of Besley and McLaren 
(1993), we may call this a “capitulation equi-
librium”, because the principal gives up all 
attempts to induce the agent to work hard: in 
this equilibrium corruption actually occurs. 
When the probability of detection lies between 
π’ and π* (Area 2), the cost of obtaining hard 
work from the agent is sufficiently low and the 
principal accepts to bear it; the bonus, how-
ever, is higher than t, which enables the agent 
to extract rent from the principal; we shall call 
this the “stick-and-carrot equilibrium”, since 
the agent is induced to work hard by a mix 
of threat of punishment and increases in the 
bonus; corruption does not occur, but its ef-
fect is to enrich the agent at the expense of the 
principal; in this case, we say that corruption 
28 The expected utility of the principal if he offers 
t = t* is equal to W°(π) ≡ w(e) — pt*(π), while his 
expected utility if he offers t = 0 is equal to W(L) ≡ 
w(e). The principal thus offers t = t* if and only if 
W°(π) > W(L), which implies pt*(π) ≤ ∆w.
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is “hidden”. When π is not lower than π*, fi-
nally, a bonus equal to t is sufficient to induce 
the agent to work hard; we call this the “de-
terrence equilibrium”, because the threat of 
punishment is sufficiently high to convince 
the agent to reject the bribe without obtaining 
any rent. Corruption is “repressed” because 
its theoretical possibility does not enable the 
agent to obtain a higher utility.
In the discussion that follows, we qualify 
these equilibria in terms of the expected util-
ity of the principal and the agent. We ignore 
the expected utility of the corruptor, for three 
different reasons. First of all, our purpose is 
to examine the effects of corruption (actual 
or hidden) on the initial relation between the 
principal and the agent; we are only margin-
ally interested in the role played by the corrup-
tor, and we are only concerned about whether 
or not he intervenes in the relation. Further-
more, in our model the bribe is equal to the 
corruptor’s willingness to pay, which leaves 
the latter indifferent about whether or not the 
agent works lazily and accepts the bribe. The 
corruptor would enjoy a higher utility only if 
the agent worked lazily rejecting the bribe, 
but this outcome does not occur in equilib-
rium. In addition, the benefits that the cor-
ruptor receives as a result of the bribe may be 
considered unworthy of social protection; for 
instance, if corruption increases the opportu-
nities for illegal pollution, the benefit of the 
company which pays the bribe and pollutes 
could hardly be considered as a positive com-
ponent of social welfare.
Figure 3 shows the expected utility of the 
principal and the agent (hereafter “the par-
ties”) in the three areas of π. The Diagram 
(a) shows the expected utility of the princi-
pal, when he offers no bonus (t = 0: straight 
horizontal line) and when he offers a bonus 
equal to t*(π) (curve); as the diagram shows, 
the principal maximises his expected utility by 
setting t = 0 when π. < π’ (capitulation equilib-
rium) and t = t*(π) otherwise. Diagrams (b.1), 
(b.2) and (b.3) show the expected utility of the 
agent, respectively, when Condition 1 holds, 
when Condition 2 holds and when both Con-
ditions fail, Condition 2 being as follows:
Condition 2 Inequality (6) holds; moreover, 
Condition 1 fails and
 ( ) ( ) ( )
'
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The meaning of these Conditions is evident 
from the diagrams, where the straight, down-
ward-sloping line shows the expected utility 
of the agent when t = 0, while the curve and 
horizontal line represent his expected utility 
when t = t*(π). When Condition 1 holds, the 
agent strictly prefers a situation with hidden 
or repressed corruption (π > 0 and t = t*(π)) 
to a capitulation equilibrium where corrup-
tion occurs but is not monitored and no bonus 
is offered (π = t = 0); when Condition 2 holds, 
the agent prefers hidden or repressed corrup-
tion if and only if π is sufficiently low, other-
wise he prefers the capitulation equilibrium: 
when both conditions fail, the agent strictly 
prefers the capitulation equilibrium.
Since the expected utility of the parties in 
a capitulation equilibrium is the same as when 
corruption is legally allowed (corruption is 
neither monitored nor punished, therefore the 
norm forbidding it is economically irrelevant), 
one result is immediately evident: while the 
principal weakly prefers to ban corruption, 
and strictly prefers to ban it whenever π > π’, 
the agent may agree or disagree with him de-
pending on the two above conditions and on 
the exogenous value of the probability of de-
tection; in particular, the agent will always 
support the ban when Condition 1 holds, and 
will continue to do so under Condition 2 pro-
vided that π is lower than some positive value 
π** > π’, such that u(e) +b = u(e) + pt(π**). In 
all other cases, the agent will oppose the ban, 
strictly preferring a capitulation equilibrium.
These results prove the following Proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3 The introduction of a norm 
prohibiting corruption is opposed by the agent 
and is not supported by the principal when 0 
< π < π’, while it is unanimously supported un-
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der Condition 1 when π ≥ π’, and under Con-
dition 2 when π’ ≤ π ≤ π**. In all other cases, 
the principal supports the norm and the agent 
opposes it.
The case when principal and agent agree 
to reject a norm against corruption is shown 
by the dotted areas in Figure 3; the case when 
they agree to introduce the norm is shown by 
the shaded areas. In both cases, the adoption 
of a ban can be decided on efficiency consid-
erations; the parties agree to introduce or re-
ject it according to which alternative yields 
a Pareto-efficient outcome. In the remaining 
areas, an agreement cannot be reached on 
mere efficiency grounds, since the introduc-
tion of the norm induces a movement along 
the Pareto-efficient frontier, benefitting one 
party at the expense of the other; the norm 
banning corruption thus becomes a political 
issue, involving a conflict over the distribution 
of rent between different members of society; 
its resolution depends on the relative bargain-
ing power of the two parties, or on their com-
parative influence over the decision-making 
authority.
Figure 3 also allows a comparison between 
the equilibria that arise when corruption is 
possible (and detected with positive probabil-
ity), and the equilibrium that arises in a world 
without corruption, which was discussed in 
Section 3 and is equivalent to the deterrence 
equilibrium in a world with corruption.
As Figure 3 shows, when π < π* the principal 
is always worse off in a world with corruption. 
If he offers a bonus equal to t*(π), he obtains 
the same work effort at a higher expected cost; 
if he offers no bonus at all, he obtains a lower 
work effort; in both cases, his expected utility 
is lower than in a world without corruption. 
The agent, on his part, is always better off in 
a situation of hidden corruption (π’ ≤ π < π*), 
where he performs the same work effort and 
obtains a higher bonus than in a world without 
corruption. In this case the agent gains what 
the principal loses, and aggregate utility is the 
same as in a world without corruption; hid-
den corruption induces a redistribution of ex-
pected utility between the two parties, which 
is decreasing with the probability of detection:
Proposition 4 Compared to the equilibrium 
in a world without corruption, hidden corrup-
tion with costless monitoring enables the agent 
to extract rent form the principal, without af-
fecting the agent’s work effort or the aggregate 
utility of the two parties; moreover, the extent 
of the redistribution in expected utility is de-
creasing in the probability of detection.
PROOF:
Hidden corruption occurs if and only if π’ ≤ 
π < π*, in which case the principal offers a bo-
nus equal to t(π) and the agent works hard and 
obtains a rent equal to p(t — t) > 0; the agent’s 
expected utility is equal to u(e) + pt, which 
is higher than his expected utility in a world 
without corruption; the principal’s expected 
utility, in turn, is equal to w(e) — pt, which is 
lower that his expected utility in a world with-
out corruption. The agent thus increases his 
expected utility at the expense of the principal, 
while the sum of their expected utility remains 
equal to w(e) + u(e), the same as in a world 
without corruption. The extent of the redistri-
bution of expected utility from the principal to 
the agent is equal to p[t(π) — t], which is a de-
creasing function of π.
Q.E.D.
When π < π’, corruption actually occurs, 
but the agent and the principal would be both 
weakly better off if the norm banning cor-
ruption were abolished. In this situation, the 
agent might in some cases prefer to be living 
in a world without corruption; in other cases, 
however, he prefers the existing corrupt world 
(the alternative depending on Conditions. 1 
and 2 as well as on the actual value of π, as 
shown in Figure 3). Aggregate utility, however, 
is lower when corruption actually occurs, be-
ing equal to w(e) + u(e), which is by assump-
tion lower than w(e) + u(e).29
29 Assumption (3), given that p/(2p — 1) < 1, im-
plies that ∆W > ∆U, which in turn implies w(e) + 
u(e) > w(e) + u(e).
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3.2 Equilibria with positive monitoring 
costs
Assume, now, that monitoring corruption 
is costly, and that its costs are related to the 
probability of detection by a positive, continu-
ous, twice differentiable function c(π), with the 
following properties: c(0) = 0 (no fixed costs); 
c’(π) > 0 (positive marginal costs), c’’ (π) > 0 
(diminishing returns). These costs are borne 
by the principal, and enter his utility function 
in the same way as the payment he makes to 
the agent; on the other hand, the principal can 
now choose the intensity of monitoring, and 
thus the probability of detection.
The principal is now confronted with two 
decisions, concerning the optimal probability 
of detection and the optimal amount of the 
bonus. While a higher probability of detec-
tion involves higher monitoring costs, it also 
reduces the incentive-compatible bonus that 
induces the agent to work hard.
Let W*(π) ≡  w(e) — pt* (π) — c(π) be the ex-
pected utility of the principal when he agrees 
to pay this bonus and let W(π) ≡ w(e) — c(π) 
be his expected utility when he pays no bonus 
at all. It can be shown that W*(π) is continu-
ous and concave, and that W*(π) > W(π) if and 
only if π > π’.
Concavity of W*(π) in the interval [π’, 1] en-
sures that it is maximised by a unique value πo 
≡ [π’, 1]; moreover, πo cannot be larger than 
π*, since W*(π) is strictly decreasing in the in-
terval [π*, 1] (a higher probability of detection 
in this interval only involves higher monitor-
ing costs without allowing any reductions in 
the incentive-compatible bonus).30 πo there-
fore lies within the interval [π’, π*]; if it is an 
internal point, it is implicitly identified by the 
FOC:
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W(π) is instead strictly decreasing in π be-
cause when the agent works lazily an increase 
in the probability of detection involves higher 
30 In this interval, t*(π) is constant and equal to t, 
while c(π) is increasing in π.
monitoring costs without any benefits for the 
principal; the maximum of W(π) thus lies at 
π = 0. The expected utility of the principal is 
therefore maximised either at π = π °, or at π 
= 0, or at both values. These three possibili-
ties are shown in Figure 4. The top diagram 
shows the first, when the principal sets π equal 
to π° and offers a bonus equal to t(π°), while 
the agent works hard and corruption remains 
hidden; the middle diagram shows the second 
possibility, when the principal sets π = 0 and 
offers no bonus, while the agent works lazily 
and corruption occurs; the bottom diagram, 
finally, shows the third possibility, when W(0) 
= W*(π°) and the principal is indifferent be-
tween the two alternatives, choosing either 
with equal probability although they involve 
a completely different work effort and corrup-
tion pattern; in this case, the system exhibits 
multiple equilibria (namely, two), as is de-
scribed by the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 (Multiple equilibria) When
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the system exhibits two equilibria, one of 
which involves hard work and hidden or re-
pressed corruption while the other involves 
a lazy work effort while corruption actually oc-
curs.
PROOF:
By equation (9), the equality in Proposition 
(5) is equivalent to: ∆w = pt(π°) + c(π°), which 
implies: W*(π°) ≡ w(e) —  pt(π°) — c(π°) = w(e) 
≡ W(0). In this case, therefore, the expected 
utility of the principal is the same if he sets π 
= π° as if he sets π = t = 0; the principal may 
choose either of these alternatives, and two 
equilibria thus exist. In one of these equilibria, 
the principal pays the incentive-compatible 
bonus and the agent works hard and rejects 
the bribe, while in the other the principal pays 
no bonus and the agent works lazily and ac-
cepts the bribe.
Q .E .D .
Using the terminology adopted in the pre-
vious subsection, these equilibria can be dis-
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tinguished into three types: a deterrence equi-
librium (when π = π° = π*), stick-and-carrot 
equilibria (when π’ ≤ π = π° < π*) and a ca-
pitulation equilibrium (when π = 0). The de-
terrence equilibrium occurs when π° = π* and 
W*(π*) ≥ w(e), since the principal sets it equal 
to π* and t equal to t. In this equilibrium, 
corruption does not actually occur (since the 
threat of punishment is too high), and is re-
pressed rather than hidden because its threat 
does not allow the agent to extract rent from 
the principal; the principal, however, still suf-
fers from the mere possibility of corruption, 
because this possibility induces him to pay for 
a high level of monitoring. The stick-and-car-
rot equilibria occur when π° < π* and W*(π*) 
≥ w(e), since the principal sets it below π* and 
t equal to t, greater than t; in these equilibria, 
corruption is hidden and the agent is able to 
extract rent. The capitula tion equilibrium fi-
nally occurs W*(π*) ≤ w(e); in this case, the 
principal sets π = t = 0 whatever the value of 
π°, the agent works lazily and corruption oc-
curs. Notice that the expected utility of the 
principal is always maximised in equilibrium, 
since it is the principal who chooses the type 
of equilibrium by deciding the level of moni-
toring.
The expected utility of the agent, instead, 
is always higher in a stick-and-carrot equilib-
rium than in a deterrence equilibrium, while 
a comparison with the capitulation equilib-
rium depends on Conditions. 1 and 2. When 
Condition 1 holds, the capitulation equilibrium 
is the worse for the agent; when Conditions. 1 
and 2 both fail, the capitulation equilibrium 
is the best; while when Condition 2 holds the 
capitulation equilibrium is preferred to the de-
terrence equilibrium, and it is also preferred 
to the stick-and-carrot equilibrium if and only 
if π° > π** (see Figure 5).
Under particular conditions, the agent may 
be indifferent between a stick-and-carrot and 
a capitulation equilibrium; if the principal is 
also indifferent between them, two equilibria 
exist which yield the same expected utility to 
both parties but involve a completely different 
behaviour on the part of the agent:
Proposition 6 When W*(π°) = w(e) and 
∆u + b = pt(π°), two equilibria exist which 
are equivalent for both the principal and the 
agent; one of these equilibria involves a lazy 
work effort and the actual occurrence of cor-
ruption, while in the other equilibrium co hid-
den or repressed and the agent works hard.
Some of the implications of this proposi-
tion will be discussed in the following section. 
Consider now the attitudes of the two parties 
towards the introduction of the legal noim 
prohibiting corruption. Like in the previous 
subsection, we shall ignore the expected util-
ity of the corruptor. Once corruption is legally 
prohibited, the level of monitoring is unilat-
erally decided by the principal, but at an ear-
lier stage the agent may have some power in 
influencing the decision on whether or not 
corruption should be legally banned. A in the 
case where monitoring is costless, the equi-
librium that is reached without a  prohibiting 
corruption is equivalent to the capitulation 
equilibrium.
Four different cases are thus possible:
when w(e) > W*(π°), the introduction of the 
norm leads to a capitulation equilib rium and 
therefore produces no effects (since its viola-
tions are not monitored); both parties are thus 
indifferent towards it,
when w(e) < W*(π°) and Conditions. 1 and 
2 fail, the introduction of the norm induces 
a stick-and-carrot or a deterrence equilibrium 
but the agent prefers a capit ulation equilibri-
um; the principal is in favour of the norm and 
the agent is against it,
when w(e) < W*(π°) and Condition 1 holds 
(or Condition 2 holds and π° ≤ π** the norm 
leads to a stick-and-carrot or a deterrence 
equilibrium which both parties prefer to a ca-
pitulation equilibrium; both parties are thus in 
favour of the norm,
when w(e) < W*(π°), Condition 2 holds 
and π° > π**, the norm leads to a stick -and-
carrot or a deterrence equilibrium which, from 
the point of view of the agent, is worse than 
a capitulation equilibrium; the agent opposes 
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the norm and the principal supports it. In this 
case, however, if π were to be set at or below 
π**, the agent would be better off with the 
norm than without it (in other words, stick-
and-carrot equilibria exist which are preferred 
by the agent to a capitulation equilibrium); as 
a result, the two parties may agree to introduce 
the norm, provided that the principal commits 
to set π ≤ π**.
A legal norm prohibiting corruption would 
be ineffective in case (i) while in case (iii) it in-
duces a Pareto-improvement; in cases (ii) and 
(iv), the introduction of the norm ben efits the 
principal and reduces the expected utility of 
the agent, becoming an issue of distribution. 
Case (iv) however is rather peculiar, because 
it involves the possibility of Pareto-improve-
ments by compromise. The parties may thus 
engage in bargaining over the appropriate 
value of π in order to reach an agreement that 
would improve the expected utility of both, 
where it would be set equal to or below π**, in 
the shaded area in Diagram (b.2) of Figure 5.
Compare, now, the three types of equilib-
ria that arise in a world with corruption and 
costly monitoring, with the equilibrium that is 
reached in a world without corruption. Unlike 
when monitoring is costless, this equilibrium 
is no longer equivalent to a deterrence equilib-
rium, because the latter involves positive mon-
itoring costs which reduce the expected utility 
of the principal and is, therefore, weakly Pare-
to-inferior. In a stick-and-carrot equilibrium, 
the agent perceives a higher expected utility 
than in a world without corruption while the 
expected utility of the principal is lower, as 
a result both of positive monitoring costs and 
of a higher level of the bonus; aggregate utility 
is also lower, due to the presence of positive 
monitoring costs. In the capitulation equilib-
rium monitoring costs are nil but the expected 
utility of the principal is lower than in a world 
without corruption; the agent’s utility may be 
higher or lower depending on Condition 1, and 
aggregate utility is lower, as shown in the pre-
vious subsection.
This yields the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 When monitoring is costly, 
the possibility of corruption always reduces 
ag gregate utility even when corruption is hid-
den or repressed. When corruption is hidden, 
the agent is able to extract rent from the prin-
cipal and his expected utility is higher than 
in a world without corruption, but his gain is 
lower than the loss incurred by the principal.
PROOF:
In a world without corruption aggregate 
utility is equal to w(e) + u(e). In a ca pitulation 
equilibrium, aggregate utility is equal to w(e) 
+ u(e), which is lower than w(e) + u(e) by as-
sumption (see (3)). In all other equilibria, ag-
gregate utility is equal to w(e) + u(e) — c(π), 
which is also lower than w(e) + u(e). Hidden 
corruption oc curs in a stick-and-carrot equi-
librium, where the agent works hard and re-
jects the bribe but receives a higher bonus 
than in a world without corruption, perceiving 
a rent equal to pt(π°)—pt and thus enjoying 
a higher expected utility than in a world with-
out corruption; the principal’s loss however is 
larger than the agent’s gain, because, on top of 
paying the bonus, the principal has to pay for 
the cost of monitoring.
Q .E.D.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we modelled corruption as 
a particular type of principal-agent-client rela-
tion. We showed that the potential for corrup-
tion arises when the client alters a pre-existing 
relation between the principal and the agent, 
leading to a Pareto-inefficient outcome or to 
a redistribution of rent in favour of the agent. 
Most economic effects arise from this pertur-
bation, and persist even when the parties re-
spond by banning the contract between the 
agent and the client. Although different types 
of equilibria arise in this case and only one of 
these types involves the actual performance 
of corruption, all these equilibria generally 
involve a different level of expected utility for 
each party with respect to the situation that 
preceded the intervention of the client.
In particular, although with a sufficiently 
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high probability of detection corruption can be 
successfully prevented by a mix of incentives 
and punishment, the possibility of corrup-
tion enables the agent to extract rent from the 
principal, unless the risk of detection is partic-
ularly high. Even in this case, while the agent 
fails to extract rent, the principal incurs a loss 
if he has to pay for the cost of monitoring.
This bears relevant implications both on 
the normative and on the empirical side. On 
the normative side, repressive interventions 
aimed at discouraging corruption by increas-
ing the threat of punishment appear to be less 
effective in reducing its economic impact, than 
preventive interventions aimed at reducing the 
opportunities for corruption, including educa-
tional programmes aimed at increasing loyalty 
and honesty. On the empirical side, cross-sec-
tion or cross-country comparisons based on 
statistical data about the actual occur rence of 
corruption may yield inaccurate results, un-
less these data are properly interpreted and 
integrated by additional information.
This paper also shows how the introduction 
of a legal norm prohibiting corruption is some-
times supported by both principal and agent, 
while in other cases it involves a conflict on the 
distribution of rent and a confrontation of bar-
gaining power and political influence; in terms 
of efficiency and distribution, an evaluation of 
corruption cannot be decided a priori, since 
corruption leads, in alternative situations, to 
Pareto-dominated outcomes or to a redistri-
bution of rent between different parties.
The model shows that multiple equilibria 
may arise even in a static context, if monitor-
ing corruption is costly for the principal. These 
equilibria always yield the same expected util-
ity to the principal, and under certain condi-
tions they yield the same expected utility also 
to the agent. These results provide interesting 
suggestions in the interpretations of the his-
torical record of some countries. On one side, 
countries which have experienced remarkable 
reductions in corruption may have rationally 
decided to switch from an equilib rium with ac-
tual corruption to one where corruption is hid-
den or repressed, enjoying only minor increas-
es in utility and social welfare; on the other 
side, countries with remarkable observable 
differences in the levels of corruption may in 
fact be enjoying similar levels of welfare, while 
countries with similar low levels of corruption 
may be affected by substantial differences in 
welfare, if corruption is completely absent in 
one country and costly prevented (hidden or 
repressed) in another.
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